The asymmetric OPFOR has been haunting the training grounds of the US Army for seventy years now, beginning shortly after World War II. Having an inherently dissimilar force is effective at training an army to face an opponent that looks, moves, and fights differently. OPFORs have run the gamut from overly broad to overly detailed. This post is a partial history of the twisting and turning nature of this training “heel”, to use the pro wrestling term.
The Circle Trigons
The first dissimilar OPFOR nation came in the form of “Aggressor”. While the name of the nation was unimaginative, everything else was not. An elaborate backstory of the nation and its ruling Circle Trigon Party being bankrolled by both the Western Allies and Soviets out of the rubble of World War II, only to emerge as a monstrous powerhouse on its own, capable of subverting the populace and launching repeated invasions of the continental US. In addition to Trigon doctrine, their manuals went into detail describing pay scales and retirement benefits (!)
The Aggressors spoke Esperanto, had differently colored uniforms with distinct ranks, and, most notably, a bizarre crested helmet.
Circle Trigon equipment was broadly similar to that of the US, but its doctrine was understandably more Soviet. It contained examples as aiming for flexibility at higher levels of command and assigning assets to match and having air forces be assigned to “Air armies” under the control of the overall ground commander. One interesting note is that while it shifted to become increasingly Russian in terms of names (a multi-division unit was called an ‘army’ by the 1960 manual instead of the American designation of ‘corps’), its highest field unit remained the “Army Group” instead of the more directly accurate “Front”.
Given their nature as army publications, the Circle Trigon manuals are relatively vague on the nature of the Aggressor Navy. They do say it exists and includes carriers (a far cry from the small, low-priority Soviet Navy in the immediate postwar period), but don’t describe it with the same detail. This is an oversight and opportunity for a scenario designer like me. Because realistically (to the extent that anything about their background can be called realistic), the fight to keep the naval supply lines open would overshadow the ground campaign.
One final note about the Circle Trigons, that was a flaw in their actual execution, but a benefit for Command designers. There were few examples of visual modifications on vehicles, and thus Aggressors entered ‘battle’ with American equipment that had triangles painted on the side. Thus my dilemma between the “actors” and “characters” is solved-it’s American units with Esperanto designations.
Cold War OPFOR
For the rest of the Cold War, the OPFORs adopted a far more sedate background than the crazed pulp tone of the Circle Trigon. Far more directly Soviet-based, with the common name “Krasnovia”, from Russian Krasny-(red), and with more effort to show visual modifications, they performed effectively.
Regrettably, this does not spark my imagination as much. Oh, I can and have gladly done exercise scens in that period. It’s just covered heavily already, and I think it’s telling that there I prefer the “actor” to the “character” by, ironically enough, making the action symmetric with US equipment on both sides.
Modern Developments
My original post on the opposing forces was on two manuals released in the early 1990s. The Heavy OPFOR remained a thinly-veiled Russia from the “Front” down, while the Light OPFOR was a lower-level force representing an ex-Soviet client. Roughly a decade later, subsequent publicly available manuals have broadened the scope by doing the following.
Separating equipment from organization. Whereas the early 1990s manuals had a pretty clear “Heavy OPFOR gets 120+mm tanks and Light OPFOR gets 115-mm” distinction, the modern guides contain multiple tiers, with everything from gizmoed up modern tanks to T-34s, both fitting in the similarly organized division.
Technological updates. Not just being more dispersed in light of better surveillance and an ever-faster kill chain, but talking about the importance of social media. Information and psychological warfare, barely mentioned in the earlier manual, has huge segments devoted to it.
Increased flexibility. The small-unit doctrine is no longer quite as detailed, and given the nature of the 2000s, irregular and ‘hybrid’ forces are given greater focus.
With a bipolar environment giving way to an increasingly complex one, the ‘building-block’ approach that enables everything from a minor irregular nuisance threat to a peer war has been effective. One training set demonstrated this by creating a range of countries from “Donovia”, the heir to Krasnovnia and regional top dog to the authoritarian sometimes ally/sometimes foe “Atropia”. Other regions around the world can be similarly made should the need arise.
Besides their direct scenario function, the OPFOR guides have been fairly useful for me in terms of seeing the (on-paper) composition of a certain unit. Stuff like what organic air defense assets a particular something has is particularly useful.
My collection of public domain OPFOR manuals has been made available here
So, it’s time for the Cold War battleships to sail again, simply because I’ve been looking up a lot of information on their hypothetical modifications. And what I saw was interesting enough to write about.
First, the 1980s reactivation of the Iowas. Historically, their modifications were minor in comparison to some of the other proposals. Updating their electronics to sync with the current fleet and adding Harpoon and Tomahawk launchers (the latter being, more so than the guns, the reason they were restored) was the extent of refitting. But the planned and proposed “Phase II” reactivations included more radical proposals for removing main turrets and replacing them with more missile tubes, a flight facility for helicopters and/or Harriers, or both.
The flight deck proposal was another version of the amphibious assault Iowa proposed in the 1960s, with the same problems. Those problems being “the blast from the main guns interfering with flight operations” and “mixing a close bombardment ship with one specifically designed to stay as far back as it can”.
Of course, a ship is only as good as the weapons it fires, and there were plans in the works for enhancing the Iowa’s main guns with different ammunition. The concept of using necked-down sabot rounds to enhance range was pursued to varying degrees. One of the most feasibly designed was the EX-148 projectile, viewed with other Iowa rounds here. The EX-148, even with an upgraded fire control system to go alongside it, was still imprecise enough to require a cluster warhead. As such, according to one of the most detailed studies, it was a specialty round designed for the role of beating back massed counterattacks against a hypothetical beachhead.
Contrasted with that actually-developed round are the flights of fancy that regularly emerged from the now-defunct US Naval Fire Support Association. Guided rounds, scramjet rounds going to ranges the EX-148 could only dream of, and of course the two combined. The most detailed examination of these exotic rounds was made in a 2007 study by colonel (and USNFSA member) Shawn Welch. In the squabbling battleship community online, the study was heavily criticized despite its unquestionably detailed and advanced simulations. My critiques (even without the technical knowledge) are twofold. Welch handwaves development costs and capabilities of his exotic rounds, and his threat example involves returning to the 90s bugaboo of a large but low-end force attacking a US deployment.
Any talk of the unquestionable expense of battleship operations cannot be made in a vacuum. The opportunity costs, applicable to even the US on a defense binge, always loom upwards. And there the BBs are found wanting. The lost supply infrastructure for battleships was already a problem in the 1980s and only got worse. Any sort of limited budgets mean that niche projects (which battleships inherently remain) are frequently the first to go. The requirement for shore support of Marine amphibious operations that have never actually been conducted in anger has led to overexpensive and frequently shelved projects like the ERGM, LASM, and now the LRLAP. This implies difficulty if the scramjet rounds were actually developed in any sort of detail.
That being said, in fantasy the battleship maintains its appeal. The weird fusion of post-USSR operational concepts and extended Cold War stuff like the upgraded shells is something I have an inexplicable liking of. EX-148s or the goofball super-shells being one of the weapons in the arsenal of the Sea Dragon/Hunter Warrior/Distributed Operations teams brings a strange smile to my face. What I also like is the absurdist (but accurate) sight of a battlecarrier standing off and launching its aircraft with the gun crews joking about their own worthlessness.
One final note involves an interesting coincidence of names. The battleships were not the only big-gun warships considered for reactivation. The Des Moines class of cruisers was considered as well-in the same “packed ABL Tomahawks first, guns second” role. Des Moines is the capitol of Iowa.
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This got me thinking of the other side of the Cold War, and a possible niche for Stalin’s big fleet. It’s not a truly practical one by any stretch of the imagination. Opportunity costs, bad enough to give an established navy that outnumbered the rest of the world pause, would be far worse for a land power that has to build everything from scratch. The inspiration came from Soviet/Russian land doctrine. Artillery was and is the cornerstone of their ground forces. Applying existing platforms to give its naval infantry the same firepower for their jaunts to Norway or Hokkaido is at least a nominally viable concept, and works better than trying to reenact Jutland.
There are still massive, massive issues. First, in the same period the postwar battleships would have been built, the Naval Infantry was outright disbanded as part of the drawdown. Even if they’d been kept and emphasized, amphibious craft would be necessary. Comparing them to battleships in terms of priority is like comparing water to a hot fudge sundae in terms of basic survival. Third, the advantages battleships would have over existing cruisers like the Chapeav and Sverdlov would be limited and arguably cost-ineffective for a navy that would have to fight for every last ruble.
That being said, for the sake of enjoyable fantasy, a gun-line supporting a 50s-60s amphibious hook has an appeal on its own.
Note: The Warships1 Forum, particularly this thread , was an invaluable resource. Credit is given to all the contributors there.
One classic Command scenario which I’ve replayed from time to time is the community pack’s Solomon Islands Incursion. In it, Papua New Guinea sends its small navy out to conduct a raid in the titular archipelago. Several things about it appealed to me.
The first was its effective simulation of a low-end force. The main priority is ammunition management and control of tiny patrol boats, a challenge entirely different from managing either end of a Tu-22 regiment vs. CVBG epic showdown. Despite this, the basic principles of naval warfare ( that effective reconnaisance and concentration of force win the day) still apply.
This landing craft is the largest ship on either side in the scenario.
The second, more interesting from a historical perspective, is its location. The battle occurs in the same area as a massive campaign in World War II, creating an interesting contrast. Then, it was massive fleets of cruisers. Now, it’s tiny vessels. But in the scenario, The Slot still has one naval battle left in it.
When creating a new scenario one of the challenges is to decide not only which units should be included but also how many of them will actually be able to fight. So the question is: Ready or not? The German “Bericht zur materiellen Einsatzbereitschaft der Hauptwaffensysteme der Bundeswehr” (Report for the readiness of the main weapon systems of Federal German Army) gives us a change to evaluate the readiness of the weapons of one of the major NATO members.
Even though some critics say the report is biased in favor of the Verteidigungsministerium (Ministry of Defense) it is surprising in what a bad shape many systems currently are and how unlikely it is that the situation will improve in the future.
The Bundeswehr
The Bundeswehr was founded in 1955 when the Federal German Republic regained most of its sovereignty and joined the NATO. Today the Bundeswehr has a strength of 176.752 active soldiers and a budget of 34.3 billion Euro. The budget is supposed to be increased over the coming years to around 40 billion a year in 2020.
Even though this puts the Bundeswehr into the top ten of the biggest military spenders the years of austerity after the end of the cold war have left a mark and many systems are outdated and new systems often years behing the scedule. The transition from a conscript army only intended to defend Germany to a professional army operating alongside the German allies all over the globe has also turned out to be a challenge.
For more information about the Bundeswehr you can take a look at my article about naming german units here on Baloogan Campaign.
The Heer
The Heer (army) is the biggest of the four branches of the Bundeswehr. Currently 59.136 soldiers are serving in the Heer. Since COMMAND is concentrating on Air and Naval Operations the weapon systems of the Heer might not be of the biggest concern for this article but should be included nonetheless.
Leopard 2
The Leopard 2 is the main battle tank of the Heer and replaced the Leopard 1. The Leopard 2 entered service in 1979 and will remain in service for the foreseeable future even though the development of a successor was announced recently (Main Ground Combat System). In 1990 the Bundeswehr fielded 2125 Leopard 2.
The Heer currently has 244 Leopard 2 and on average 167 Leopard 2 were available and 132 of those were considered combat-ready. Additional 84 Leopard 2A7V are supposed to arrive until 2022. The number of Leopard 2 in service is supposed to reach 328 eventually. In 2016 the number of tank battalions was increased and the PzBtl 414 was formed as part of a dutch mechanized brigade under the command of the German 1. Panzerdivision.
Even after the arrival of the A7V Version and a possible successor on the horizon plans for further modernization continue including replacing the 120-mm-Glattrohrkanone L/55 with a 130 mm version.
Panzerhaubitze 2000
The Panzerhaubitze 2000 (armored howitzer 2000) is a self propelled 155mm howitzer and considered to be among the most advanced and powerful conventional artillery systems in the world. The Heer currently has 124 systems since 22 were sold to Lithuania in 2015. The level of availability is considered to be high. In 2015 66 Systems were available on average and of those 43 were combat-ready. The low rate of combat readiness is supposed to be caused by ongoing modernization and a high wear on the systems caused by exercises.
The number of available units is considered to be sufficient for the current tasks of the Heer.
Schützenpanzer Puma
The Schützenpanzer Puma is a modern infantry fighting vehicle designed to replace the Schützenpanzer Mader. The Puma is armed with a fully stabilized 30 mm autocannon enabling the Puma to fire on the move. As secondary armament the Puma has a 5,56 mm MG4 and Spike anti tank missiles.
Germany has ordered approximately 400 Pumas and the first Pumas entered service in 2015. Currently 89 Pumas have entered service with 48 systems available on average with 23 systems ready for service. The system is not yet ready for combat and still under development.
Schützenpanzer Marder
The Marder remains the weapon of the Panzergrenadiere (mechanized infantery) until the Puma is fully available. The Marder entered service in 1971 and around 2100 Pumas were produced for the Heer. The Marder is armed with a 20mm cannon.
Currently 388 Marder are in service of which 321 were available on average. 222 Units were considered combat ready.
Heersflieger
The situation of the material mentioned above is problematic enough but the Heer manages to fulfill its obligations within the NATO. Really problematic is the situation where planes and helicopters are concerned.
Unterstützungshubschrauber Tiger
The UHT is a medium-weight multi-role fire support helicopter. Armed with HOT-3 or PARS 3 its main role was to destroy soviet tanks but this has changed over the years even though the missing MG remains problematic.
Currently 42 Tiger are in service, 27 available and 12 ready. This is an increase of nearly 50% compared to 2015.
Even though the Tiger is not really ready for combat four Tiger were deployed in Afghanistan between 2012 and 2013 and in 2017 the Tiger will be deployed to Mali as part of MINUSMA together with the NH90.
Hubschrauber NH90
The NH90 is a medium sized transport helicopter currently entering service. Currently the Heer has 48 Systems with 29 Systems available on average with only 9 fully operational. It remains problematic that a high number of the helicopters are only prototypes, that spare parts are not available and maintenance crews are still training.
The development of the NH90 SeaLion is still delayed and the first working units are supposed to arrive not before 2019.
Hubschrauber CH-53
The CH-53 is the heavy transport helicopter of the German Heer. Currently the Heer has 72 CH-53 but the number will be reduced to 66. Of those 72 only around 60% were available due to the undergoing modernization to the version CH-53GA. Of those 60% only 40% were fully operational. Some spare parts are no longer available on the marked so that maintenance becomes increasingly difficult.
Luftwaffe
The Luftwaffe is the German air force with currently 28,186 active soldiers.
Eurofighter
The Eurofighter is a highly agile multirole fighter. Currently around 487 units have been build. The Eurofighter has replaced the F4 Phantom as fighter aircraft in the Luftwaffe and serves in the Taktische Luftwaffengeschwader “Boelcke”, the Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 71 “Richthofen”, the Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 73 “Steinhoff” and the Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 74. The Eurofighter is used for the two QRA (Quick Reaction Alert) for Germany.
Currently 123 Eurofighter are in service with around two thirds available and 50% of those fully operational. Missing spare parts and time consuming maintenance are responsible for the low number of available units.
Tornado
The Luftwaffe has currently 93 Tornados. Two thirds were available but only 44% operational on average. Undergoing modernization to the ASST A3 version and missing spare parts are considered responsible for that unsatisfying situation. The Tornados are used as Tornado IDS (Interdiction Strike), Tornado Recce (Reconnaissance) and Tornado ECR (Electronic Combat Reconnaissance). As part of the Operation Inherent Resolve Tornado Recce are supporting the international coalition against ISIS.
The Tornado is used by the Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 33 and the Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 51 „Immelmann“. As part of the Nuclear Sharing the Tornados of the Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 33 are trained and equipped to use nuclear weapons.
The Tornado will remain in service for the foreseeable future.
A400M
The A400M Atlas is a transport aircraft for tactical and strategic airlift and operated by the Lufttransportgeschwader 62. Constant delays of delivery have caused that the Luftwaffe has only received 5 A400M until 2016. Around half of those units were available on average but that decreased towards the end of the year.
In December of 2016 the Luftwaffe received a 6th A400M and the first unit fully certified for tactical operations and equipped with counter measures. Eventually the Luftwaffe will have 40 A400M even thou 53 have been ordered but 13 will be sold to other countries.
Tansall
Since the A400M is still delayed the C-160 Transall will remain in service until 2021. Originally 110 units were ordered but only 41 remain in service. Of those 75% were available on average.
Marine
With 16011 soldiers the Marine is the smallest force of the Bundeswehr. Even though the Marine is small it is involved in more operations around the world then the other parts of the Bundeswehr.
Fregatten
The Bundeswehr had 14 frigates in 2016 including 4 units which are no longer operational. In general the availability of the frigates is considered to be good but the low number units stretched over the high number of operations is problematic.
Bremen-Klasse (F 122)
The Bremen Klasse was build between 1979 and 1990 and its main capability is submarine hunting. Originally 8 units were build and three remain in service.
Karlsruhe (F 212)
Augsburg (F 213)
Lübeck (F 214)
The units will be decommissioned between 2017 and 2021 and replaced by the Baden-Würtemberg Klasse (F 125).
Brandenburg-Klasse (F 123)
The Brandenburg Klasse was build between 1992 and 1996 and replaced the destroyers of the Klasse 101/101A. Originally the main focus was anti submarine warfare but the units have been equipped with the ESSM to increase the AAW capability.
Fregatte Brandenburg (F 215)
Fregatte Schleswig-Holsten (F 216)
Fregatte Bayern (F 217)
Fregatte Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
Sachsen-Klasse (F 124)
The Sachen-Klasse was build between 1999 and 2005 and replaced the destroyers of the Lütjens-Klasse. The ships main role is anti air warfare.
Fregatte Sachsen (F 219)
Fregatte Hamburg (F 220)
Fregatte Hessen (F 221)
A fourth unit was considered but not ordered due to budget cuts.
Baden-Würtemberg-Klasse (F125)
Currently the ships of the Baden-Würtemberg-Klasse are under construction. The first unit, the Baden-Würtemberg (F 222) is currently undergoing trials. Main focus of the class are peacekeeping missions and long maintenance periods. For the first time two crews will be switching places so that the ship can remain in the field for over a year before returning to Germany for maintenance.
Baden-Würtemberg (F 222) – commissioned in 2017
Nordrhein-Westfalen (F 223) – planned for late 2017
Sachsen-Anhalt (F 224) – planned for 2019
Rheinland-Pfalz (F 225) – planned for 2019
The units will be replacing the Bremen-Klasse.
Korvetten
The Braunschweig-Klasse replaced the attack crafts of the Marine. The first 5 units were build between 2004 and 2007. Technical difficulties delayed the commissioning for years. The units are designed for maritime surveillance.
Korvette Braunschweig (F 260)
Korvette Magdeburg (F 261)
Korvette Erfurt (F 262)
Korvette Oldenburg (F 263)
Korvette Ludwigshafen am Rhein (F 264)
In 2016 it was decided to order additional five units since the first five required more maintenance then expected and the NATO demanded more available ships from Germany. It was decided to use the existing class to prevent long development times. The units are supposed to be ready in 2019.
U-Boote
The Marine is operating six units of the Klasse 212A. On average three of the six boats were available. The time consuming and complex maintenance of the units and the fact that three of the boats are still undergoing trials were responsible for that. It was not problematic to fulfill the NATO requirements of one available unit though.
Sea Lynx
The Marine has currently 22 LYNX mk 88A. Usually around 5 units are ready. It remains problematic that the Navy needs at least 6 units to fulfill all obligations and secure training at the same time.
Sea King
The Marine has 21 SEA KING Mk 41. The Sea King is mainly used for land based SAR and to support special forces of the Navy. Only four(!) units were available on average even though the Navy needs at least six fully operational units to fulfill all requirements. Even keeping four units ready is extremely difficult due to the age of the system and missing spare parts. Thy System is supposed to remain in service until 2023 and will be replaced by the SEA LION from 2019 onward but the Sea Lion is also delayed several years.
P3c Orion
In 2003 Germany bought 8 P3C Orion from the Netherlands to replace the ageing Breguet Atlantic even though the dutch units were already 20 years old themselves. The first P3C Orion was delivered in 2006. The P3C is mostly used for maritime surveillance and participates in international operations like ATALANTA.
In 2015 three of the eight units were available most of the time but in 2016 it was unveiled that 30th September 2016 not a single plane was available and that one of the planes was less then three hours in the air in over 10 years.
P3C Orion Status
Conclusion
In general it can be seen that the units can be classified into three different categories:
“old” systems fully available
systems suffering from age and missing spare parts
new systems not fully ready yet
Systems like the Leopard 2 are available in sufficient numbers and the ships of the navy are also not that problematic as far as availability is concerned. The overall number is of course another problem.
Really problematic is the situation were planes and helicopters are concerned. With the exception of the Eurofighter (to a certain extend) all systems used by the Heer, the Luftwaffe or the Navy are far too old or not yet ready. Leading to situations were civil helicopters are leased to train pilots and make sure they receive the necessary hours in the air to keep the license.
The delay in the MH90 Sea Lion program makes it difficult for Germany to fulfill its international obligation to provide SAR helicopters.
Really bad is the situation concerning the P3C where even after 10 years most units are still unavailable. This is even more problematic since the RQ-4E Euro Hawk has been canceled.
Even the planned increase in military spending will only help a little since it will not overcome technical difficulties in newly developed systems and missing spare parts will still be missing.
So, now that I’ve gotten a reveal of one of my least favorite scenario works out of the way, I can move on to happier stuff. One of my scenarios I feel the most admiration for is They Came From The Museum. Now I can reveal the making of it.
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The scenario itself takes place in the contemporary Ukraine war, and is a short ground attack scenario.
What inspired me to make it was a propaganda video filmed by the eastern separatists that involved the supposed restoration of exhibits in the Luhansk Aviation Museum. The two restored in the video were an old L-29 trainer (which at least taxied around), and an Su-25 (which just sat there while the camera crew interviewed the ‘pilot’). My immediate conclusion was that this was either a propaganda stunt (which seems to be accurate in light of later events) or a way to slip the cloak of “duelist deniability” over the Russian air force that so far kept it out of the fight.
The term ‘duelist deniabilty’ is one that I’ve first used in an old post about air power in civil wars. The term is used for the longstanding effect of deniability that’s nominally true compared to the letter of the ‘law’, but is in obvious violation of its ‘spirit’. The original example comes from illegal duels where the seconds would turn their backs to the duelists and then say under oath that they saw nothing. Unlike genuine deniability, duelist deniability is there more for legalistic reasons than actual obfuscation. The duelist deniable aspect of the Russian support in Ukraine is not unprecedented, and has parallels in both the Pakistani attack on the Kargil posts in 1999 (where a dubious excuse that they were local militants was used), and for the Soviet deployment of MiG-15s en masse in the Korean War (where North Korean markings were used and strict deployments limited).
Duelist deniability has been far easier for land forces then aerial ones, and is essentially impossible for naval vessels larger than small boats[1]. But it has been done. MiG Alley is the largest and most notable example, but the Americans have had their share of operations too. The CIA’s use of World War II surplus aircraft to support rebels in the Guatemalan, Indonesian, and Cuban operations was an example of it. Those operations also expose the risk of duelist deniability, since the latter two were embarrassing failures.
But the political context was only one reason why I made the museum men the way I did. The rest had to deal with a gameplay goal.
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The scenario “Iron Hand” is an official one included with the game since its release. Featuring Russia against Azerbaijan, it sets a good template for a post-Soviet “near abroad” conflict. Too good of a template, in fact. Storyline politics aside, I didn’t want it to feel like an Iron Hand imitator. So I needed a way to artificially restrict the Russian side. And the need for duelist deniability provided that.
The choice of a MiG-25, Su-25, and L-39 was part inspired by the video (L-39 being the successor to the L-29), and part a desire to use the super-fast Foxbat. They wouldn’t overmatch their adversary and the player would need to use tactics. And I could use Lua to change up the opposition. For Ukraine, I had an SA-11 and SA-5 battery. Early tests revealed the overmatch, so I reduced the amount of weapons they had. This was for both balance and to symbolize the wrecked state of the nation’s armed forces at that period. Then I used WRA to give the batteries personality. The SA-11 is careless and launches everything immediately without regards to efficiency, while the SA-5 is more cautious and launches one missile at a time in a smaller envelope.
After that it was time to add what TVTropes calls the Beef Gates. These were ways to semi-organically keep the player away from areas I didn’t want them to go. Like the deathclaws in Fallout New Vegas keeping the player on the path of the beginning quests, I added S-300 units with full ammo around the Ukrainian airbase and SA-5 battery to keep the player’s small force away from them.
Then came the Su-27s. In theory, they would overmatch their opponents. In practice, I might have dialed them down too much[2]. They were set to novice proficiency and given a small loadout of only weaker Alamo-MRs.
The ground targets were set, and it came time for determining scoring. I decided against it. Part of it was that scoring in game terms somehow felt disrespectful towards a scen set in a real and ongoing war. Another part of it was that I didn’t know what units would be the highest priority, and didn’t want to push the player into having to pick the “right” option. So I made the briefing deliberately vague.
Then came the trickiest but most fulfilling part. The Lua script that determined the Ukrainian Air Force’s response. I felt like it was both modest (three options, the latter two not apparently obvious) and took advantage of Lua’s potential. I liked the outcome so much that I used it as an example script in a post on how to use Lua to make variable outcomes.
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All in all, I have an unusually high amount of pride in the scenario. If I had the time and motivation, I can see improvements-changing the multiunit player airbases to single-unit ones, eliminating the extraneous radars, and maybe giving them additional ISR assets that can’t cross the border without penalty (I used a system for doing so in a previous scenario that doesn’t even need Lua). I could also beef up, or at least possibly beef up (with more Lua) the enemy air defenses. But even as is, the scenario I feel was one of the few that met my high standards.
[1]This led to an amusing reversal of doctrine for another potential scenario of mine, where during the 1998 Afghan crisis, Pakistan uses duelist-deniable naval commandos in small boats to harass the Iranian Navy. Yes, Iran uses conventional large vessels defending against swarms of enemy small boats.
[2]The MiG-25s win a lot of the time. I’ve attributed it to better numbers since my playtests involved them ganging up on the Flankers, but even matches also have them winning surprisingly often. It’s not that better a loadout since the Foxbats also have a restricted default loadout with just two Acrids, nor is it far better proficiency because they’re only one level (Cadet) above their opponent. Later guesses involve a combination of the brute-force range of the AA-6 being enough to put the enemy onto the defensive and the novice proficiency penalty being so great that it essentially nullifies superior performance altogether, regardless of context.
I came across this post from Maimgara who posted this excellent prose on SA’s AIRPOWER/Cold War thread. Without further ado, I present Maimgara’s ICBM Basing Modes – Where can I hide my ICBMs today?
–The Management
I recently came across the fantastic Arms Control Wonk blog and podcast, which on Oct 10 did an episode on a feasibility study done by DoD in December 1980 on where to base the up-and-coming MX weapons system (known today as LGM-118 Peacekeeper). Parts of this is so Cold War and hilarious today, that I thought I’d share.
The document is available here http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a956443.pdf
The MX program started in the 1960s and resulted in 50 Peacekeeper missiles being deployed in Minutemen silos, starting from 1986. The Peacekeepers became a casualty of the START II arms treaty with Russia and the last was decommissioned September 2005.
The MX/Peacekeeper is meant to be a survivable weapon, to be used either as a first strike counter-force (blowing up opponents silos/C3/HQ) or a second-strike weapon, which in short deters a first strike, because the weapon will survive a surprise first strike and still strike back at the Soviets.
It’s essential that the weapon system will survive a targeted counter-force nuclear attack, receive attack authorization and target data and be able to launch. Each MX had 10 warheads with a 300kT yield each, with an accuracy (CEP) of 330 ft.
To survive and launch post strike, the authors of this document considered 30 options, from extant and well-known over unusual all the way to lunacy. Each of the 30 options are graded on 11 criteria:
3 Survivabiliy and independence criteria.
3 Operational Feasibility, detailing if it’s possible to keep civilians away, are the weapons secure from conventional attack/sabotage and is the military able to operate the weapons
5 Other criteria, considering if new technology is needed, how big an environmental impact the system has and cost. Treaty violations are mentioned too, but in the most throw-away fashion.
Each of the 30 options are graded on the 11 criteria on a 4 point scale: Major Negative Feature (X*), Negative Feature (X), Satisfactory (V) and Major Positive Feature (V*) THE LEAST INSANE:
These options are included in the document mostly for having a baseline, they are tried and tested methods of ICBM storage and launching.
Option 30: MX/MPS (Multiple Protective Shelter) “Racetrack”
I mention this, not because its (comparatively) crazy, but because it was the recommendation from the report and as such most planning was done.
4600 hardened shelters are placed over 5500 square miles connected by road, each shelter at least 1 mile apart. In these 4600 shelters are hidden 200 real missiles and 4400 decoys, with transporters shuffling missiles and decoys from shelter to shelter. The idea is that each shelter is spaced and hardened such that a warhead can only take out one shelter. With decoys and shuffling, the soviets would have to expend 4600 warheads to be sure they got them all.
Grades from this basing mode is all “satisfactory” or better.
This basing mode is the recommendation from the report, which to me seems to skip too easily over the costs of building 4600 hardened shelters, 6000 miles of gravel road and 4400 decoy missiles plus the cost of the 200 real missiles. Each shelter would need fibre optic communications and power cables.
The MX/MPS layout was okay’ed by President Carter in 1979 and cost was estimated to be $37 billion ($99 billion inflation adjusted). At first Utah was in on the idea, however the Mormons shot it down and it was killed by Reagan in 1981 as “a Rube Goldberg scheme”. As mentioned the MX missiles ended up as Peacekeepers in Minutemen silos.
Option 14: Hard Rock Silo
A Minuteman style silo is placed in hard rock, such as granite. This would harden the silo to about 3000 PSI (everything but a direct hit) but be more costly and slower than a known silo.
This basing option is judged to be vulnerable to increasingly accurate Soviet warheads. Bonus style points for the name.
Option 18+19: Commercial Rail / Dedicated Rail
In the 80,000 miles of rail in NW continental US, trains of a locomotive, 5 support cars and 2 missile carrying cars roam, able to launch from either existing or new sidings. Civilian train personnel operate the locomotives, while a 42 man crew service and launch the missiles. This setup got to the prototype stage, with a complete set of components being manufactured. The system was canceled over costs and security concerns (warheads and propellant would be bad in an accident, especially as the cars were meant to be painted as normal refrigerator box cars.
The Dedicated rail option was purpose-built automatic trains and TEL-cars on 22000 miles of dedicated railway over 90000 square miles. This would take care of the security concerns, but the costs of new rail materiel and land would be substantial.
As a sidenote, the Soviet fielded the RT-23 Molodets (SS-24 Scalpel) and had 56 missiles on trains upto approx 2000.
Option 15: Deep Tunnel
Here we head into the Cold War weeds, with increasing cost and insanity.
A suitable mesa or mountain of hard rock is found and several 3000 ft deep shafts is drilled, down to a tunnel network connecting the launch shafts and living/maintenance areas. In the tunnel system, a group of TELs carry missiles, which are launched through the 3000 ft shafts (or Vertical Exit Ports) towards Russia. The scale of the base varies from one monster-base with all 200 missiles and about 100 shafts to about 10 bases with 20 missiles each. To disable a base, each exit must be hit by a direct hit, otherwise the missiles can be launched through even a single open exit. After nuclear Armageddon, base personnel would dig their way out of their citadel somehow.
This option grades high on survivability but badly on costs and technology. Would make for bitching secret evil mastermind lairs though.
There are several more options that made it to the prototype stage (Option 9: Wide Body Jet) or saw widespread use in Soviet (Option 20: Off-Road Mobile), but I’ll focus on the totally Cold War from now on.
A BAD IDEA:
Option 7: Sea Sitter
A 2 million pound amphibian plane carrying 4 ICBMs. The monster seaplane (B-52 max takeoff weight is 488,000 pounds) has a 375 ft wingspan and would fly from its home base, land at a random location and sit there before relocating and eventually returning to base. If it needed to launch its missiles, it would take off and launch during flight. I’m sure building such a seaplane would be no problem, and there would be no problems at all operating in bad weather or with saltwater ingestion in the engines.
Option 21: ICBM HOVERCRAFTS (Okay, the name is really Ground Effect Machine)
Okay, I have a really great idea! Let’s make a 260,000 pound hovercraft with a ICBM on it, build 600 of them and let them roam over 90,000 square miles!
Yes, this is a proposal, but I’m not sure how serious it is. The hovercrafts are pretty vulnerable to the overpressure from blasts, so they would need an excessive area to disperse over. Furthermore, the terrain is important, as hovercrafts cannot handle steep grades or trees
This is graded badly on survivability and practicality. For some reason the hovercrafts are planned as unmanned vehicles.
Option 28: Pool (or 4600 giant swimming pools)
In this proposal, the MX missiles are placed in 200 canisters, which can erect and launch while submerged in one of 4600 pools of water, each 300 ft long, 100 ft wide and 40 ft deep.
Between these 4600 pools, 10 transporters move – and either move a real missile from pool to pool or shuffle around decoys, so it is impossible to know which pool contains a real missile or a decoy. The water is dyed and a roof over the pool conceal which pools contain a MX and which are decoys.
I’ll note here that each pool contains 6.5 million gallons, or 10 olympic swimming pools, and the system would need 4600 of them. These 4600 pools are spaced 1 mile apart, so one warhead cannot hit more than one. Besides the phenomenal amount of water, the system needs 5000 miles of heavy-duty road for the 1,400,000 pound transporters and power/communications for each pool.
Option 4+5: HYDRA / ORCA
An ICBM is placed in a waterproof canister, and released in the ocean. Yup. 200 ICBMs in tin cans floating in the ocean. No manned command posts or anything, just warheads in a can floating in the ocean. It’s a SLBM without all that expensive submarine part. At launch, the canisters would receive radio message to launch and blast off towards Russia.
The similar ORCA system is the canisters tethered to the ocean floor, staying there until launch where they would release, float to the surface and blast off.
These are given majorly negative ratings in that ships could ram the canisters and flood them, which would be bad.
Happy New Year, Baloogan Campaign readers. As a New Years resolution, I vowed to post about the “making of” some of my favorite Command creations. Or, in this case, my least favorite Command creation.
Now, I like bad things. I like reading bad things, like the the niche cult mess of the NFL SuperPro. I’ve definitely made bad things, including a story where the final boss of an Aerosmith tie-in video game killed the Kool Aid Man (and it didn’t even have a meme like “Oh Ye-OOOOOOOW!”) . Now, I’ve made one unambiguously bad Command scenario. As harsh as I am on myself about my abilities, I can say this is the worst. I’ve seen forum posts with people asking “What’s up with this ‘Myanmar Defense’ scenario”?
I’ll finally say what’s up with it. There were three things going into the production.
I was wanting to make a weird cinematic art scenario.
I wanted it someplace different from the norm.
I was suffering from horrific writer’s block, and wanted to finish it quickly.
So, after agonizing over what to do, I settled on Myanmar. Here’s what the scenario involves. You have an airbase with a few J-7s, which cannot be readied in time to do anything. You watch an SR-72 (fastest plane in the game) teleport in, fly around for a bit, teleport out, get a cryptic message that only states “WE HAVE OVERFLOWN MYANMAR AS A SIGNAL”, and then the scenario ends. Is it the US taunting this notoriously insular dictatorship with their secret weapon? Aliens? The Syndicate? Even I didn’t really know what the SR-72 was supposed to represent.
The whole thing is a bait and switch-the scenario is marked to last for twelve hours, but only lasts for thirty minutes. The SR-72 came in part from a thread on the forums where someone put in a DB request for a hypersonic UFO-I felt that the hypothetical conspiracy aircraft would be the best reenactor.
At best I can say the scenario gave me practice with the event editor, but it’s a telling sign that I haven’t really repeated much of it. I have thought of other concepts, including a similar bait and switch idea that would start off as a deliberately generic 198X WWIII Battle of the GIUK Gap but then immediately turn to ICBMs destroying everything. That I rejected as, among other things, being too mean spirited.
But if it’s an embarassing creation, it’s a fondly embarassing creation. I want it to stay in the community pack, and if it’s the Command equivalent of KISS trying to do disco or Captain Beefheart’s attempt at playing conventional music, so be it.
The Heer (army) is the biggest of the four branches of the Bundeswehr. Currently 59.136 soldiers are serving in the Heer. Since COMMAND is concentrating on Air and Naval Operations the weapon systems of the Heer might not be of the biggest concern for this article but should be included nonetheless.
The Luftwaffe is the German air force with currently 28,186 active soldiers.
With 16011 soldiers the Marine is the smallest force of the Bundeswehr. Even though the Marine is small it is involved in more operations around the world then the other parts of the Bundeswehr.
P3C Orion Status
